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Abstract
When exposed to similar migration flows, countries with different institutional systems
may respond with different levels of openness. We study in particular the different responses
determined by different electoral systems. We find that Winner Take All countries would
tend to be more open than countries with PR when all other policies are kept constant, but,
crucially, if we consider the endogenous differences in redistribution levels across systems,
then the openness ranking may switch.
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1 Introduction
What role do institutions play for the interpretation of the different responses that different coun-
tries seem to have to the threat of increasing migration flows? When there is a perception that
migrants could be a threat for employment or income levels, politicians’ electoral incentives may
push them to display increasing hostility to open borders, but such electoral concerns could have
different intensities and/or implications depending on the electoral system. We analyze this ques-
tion using a political economy model previously used to study the implications of electoral systems
for the level of redistribution, with the additional goal of studying the interplay between immigra-
tion and redistribution policies.
We use a model of policy making with endogenous occupational choice, an extension of Austen-
Smith (2000). In that paper the population size is fixed, while in this paper we assume that entry
of immigrants is a constant flow as long as the institutional system is such that leaving the doors
∗Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, grant 694583 on power relations, for financial support.
†Bocconi University, CEPR, Dondena and IGIER
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 open is preferred to building a wall by the majority of members of parliament. The main insight
of the paper is that the predictions about immigration policies chosen in countries with different
electoral systems may be completely reversed when redistribution levels are made endogenous to
the electoral system as well. We show that openness would be more likely in winner take all
systems than in PR systems for any given same level of redistribution of income, but, once one
takes into account the endogenous redistribution levels, the relative openness result switches.
As an intuition, in the absence of endogenous taxation differences, PR is weakly more closed
because the average worker’s preferences are the ones that matter (especially in a capital intensive
and productive country), while in a WTA system the decisive agent is the median voter in the
distribution of preferences over immigration policies, which happens to be an agent with lower
talent, deriving relative greater utility from the increased aggregate income from migration. En-
dogenous taxation is crucial, and can reverse the prediction: PR induces higher taxes, and this can
induce the set of native agents who self-select into an employee occoupation to be less than 1/2
of the total native population, which implies that the decisive agent cannot remain the average
worker, but rather an unemployed individual, whose primary concern are the redistributive bene-
fits. Given that total benefits increase in aggregate income under reasonable conditions, especially
at the beginning of the migration flow, PR countries can be more open than WTA countries.
Let us briefly discuss the relationship of this paper to the empirical literature. In our model,
immigration affects the native population both through wages and through welfare transfers. The
report produced by the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) contains
an extensive review of theoretical and empirical results of the effect of immigration on employment
and wages as well as on its fiscal impact. The empirical evidence about the impact of immigration
on natives’s wages is mixed. Some papers found that immigration decreases wages in the receiving
country (among others, Altonji and Card (1991), Monras (2015), Borjas (2003, 2016)), others
that the effect is negligible (among others Card (2001, 2009)) and some others that the effect
is positive (Ottaviano and Peri (2012)). Dustman, Frattini, and Preston (2013) estimate the
effect of immigration along the distribution of wages and show that the effect is negative for
lower parts of the distribution and positive at the top. Important factors affecting the outcome
of the analysis are the degree of substitutability between natives and immigrants, the degree of
substitutability among different groups of workers and whether the analysis takes a short-run or
long run perspective (i.e. whether capital is allowed to adjust to the inflow of migrants or not).1
Our model assumes perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants, it considers only one
labour market and disregards the adjustment of capital. Given these assumptions, the negative
effect of immigration on equilibrium wage that our model displays seems in line with empirical
findings.
Immigration impacts welfare transfers to natives in two ways. On the one hand, when working,
1The different results are also due to different estimation techniques and possible misallocation of migrants in
the relevant experience and skills groups (downgrading). See Dustmann, Scho¨nberg and Stuhler (2016).
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 immigrants increase tax revenues and therefore transfers. On the other hand, they increase the
number of people among which tax revenues must be redistributed. Whether immigrants are net
contributors or receivers depends on the share of resources they are entitled to receive. This is
a key parameter in our analysis (the parameter α) and is a key determinant of natives’ attitudes
towards immigrants (see e.g. Facchini and Mayda, 2009, and Preston, 2014).
Given that in our model migration is described as a flow that keeps modifying endogenous
variables as it continues, the paper offers a stylized dynamics also of natives’ preferences. The
economic consequences of immigration can indeed affect the natives’ preference over immigration
(see e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Barone et al (2016) show that these effects can also affect
voting decisions by the native population: immigration leads natives to vote more for center-right
parties.
As far as the political economy literature is concerned, to our knowledge we are the first to
compare winner take all and proportional representation electoral systems in terms of endogenous
immigration policies. We have chosen to use mainly the modeling insights of Austen-Smith (2000)
because endogenous occupational choice seems to be an important part of the dynamic phenomenon
we wanted to describe. Morelli (2004) displays other important contrasts between winner take all
and proportional systems, in terms of party formation and policy outcomes, and hence some more
future results could be obtained also from that framework.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of political and economic
choices, namely occupational choice by citizens and the consequent class and party formation that
determines, through the political institutions, the taxation and immigration policies. Section 3
describes the equilibrium results when the tax rate is kept equal across countries with different
electoral systems. Section 4 displays the results when redistribution levels differ endogenously
across systems. Section 5 shows by simulation the reversal result, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider two countries that are identical in every aspect, except for the electoral system they
use (see description below). Both countries have a mass one of native individuals. Moreover, there
is a mass one of potential entrants in each country. At the beginning of the game all potential
migrants are out, and, if a country leaves the borders open, they enter at a constant rate. Formally,
consider any country and let Qt ∈ [0, 1) be the share of immigrants that have already entered in
the country at time t, with Q0 = 0. The assumption of constant flow if borders are kept open
implies that Qt+1 = Qt + δ, δ > 0, until either Q = 1 is reached or until the country’s government
decides to build a wall to stop the flow, whichever comes first.
Each individual (native or immigrant) is characterised by a type θ ∈ (0, θ¯). We denote by g(θ)
the distribution of types in the population of natives. We assume g(·) symmetric, with mean and
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 median denoted by θ˜. The set of immigrants entering each of the two countries in each period is
sampled from a distribution h(θ). Let both θg(θ) and θh(θ) be non decreasing in θ. We will be
more precise about the characteristics of h(θ) later in the paper.
Individuals can select one of three possible occupations: becoming an employer (e), becoming
an employee (l) or being unemployed (d). An employer of type θ can employ L units of labor to
produce an amount F (L, θ) of consumption good, which is assumed to be the only good consumed
in the economy and whose price is normalized to one. The function F (·, ·) is at least twice
differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave in L and strictly convex in θ.
Furthermore, it is also assumed that ∂2F/∂θ∂L > 0 for all θ > 0.
Letting w be the wage paid for each unit of labor, the employer’s gross income is
ye(L,w, θ) = F (L, θ)− wL.
If an individual chooses to become an employee, she inelastically provides θ units of labor and
receives a gross income
yl(w, θ) = θw.
Both employers and employees pay a cost of working c > 0 and their income is taxed at a rate
τ ∈ [0, 1]. Taxes are redistributed to the whole population in the form of lump-sum transfers. For
any stock Qt of immigrants having entered the country at a given date t, and for any tax level
τ and wage w, let λj(τ, w,Qt) be the set of types choosing occupation j ∈ {e, l, d}. The total
aggregate income in the country is
Y (τ, w,Qt) =
∫
λe(τ,w,Qt)
ye(L,w, θ)[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ +
∫
λl(τ,w,Qt)
yl(L,w, θ)[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ (1)
so that tax revenues are τY (τ, w,Qt). We assume that no debt can be accumulated and that
each immigrant obtains a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the tax revenues. The remaining amount is
redistributed equally among natives. Let bI(τ, w,Qt, α) = ατY (τ, w,Qt) be the benefits received
by each immigrant and b(τ, w,Qt, α) = (1 − αQt)τY (τ, w,Qt) be those received by each native.
The net income xj(·, θ) of a native individual of type θ in occupation j ∈ {e, l, d} is
xe(L, τ, w,Qt, α, θ) = (1− τ)ye(L,w, θ) + b(τ, w,Qt, α)− c
xl(τ, w,Qt, α, θ) = (1− τ)yl(w, θ) + b(τ, w,Qt, α)− c
xd(τ, w,Qt, α, θ) = b(τ, w,Qt, α)
The corresponding net incomes for immigrants are obtained by replacing b(τ, w,Qt, α) with bI(τ, w,Qt, α)
in the expressions above.
For any wage level w and any type θ, let L(w, θ) denote the amount of labour that maximizes
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 an employer’s net income. Given the assumptions on the production function, L(w, θ) is strictly
decreasing in w and strictly increasing in θ. Since from now on we will only consider the optimal
amount of labour demanded by employers, we will sometimes simplify notation by using L instead
of L(w, θ). Definition 1 extends the concept of sorting equilibrium contained in Austen-Smith
(2000) (AS henceforth) to our framework.
Definition 1. At any fixed tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and immigration level Qt ∈ [0, 1], a sorting equilib-
rium is a wage rate wt = w(τ,Qt) such that∫
λe(τ,wt,Qt)
L(wt, θ)[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ =
∫
λl(τ,wt,Qt)
θ[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ
and for all θ ∈ Θ, for all j, j′ ∈ {e, l, d}, θ ∈ λj(τ, wt, Qt) implies xj(·, θ) ≥ xj′(·, θ).
By Proposition 1 in AS, a sorting equilibrium always exists and is characterised by pairs of
types θ1t = θ
1(τ, wt, Qt) and θ
2
t = θ
2(τ, wt, Qt)), with θ
1
t < θ
2
t , such that
λd(τ, wt, Qt) = (0, θ
1
t ) λl(τ, wt, Qt) = [θ
1
t , θ
2
t ] λe(τ, wt, Qt) = (θ
2
t , θ¯)
Type θ1t is the type who is indifferent between becoming unemployed and working as an employee.
Given the definition of net income for the two types,
θ1t =
c
(1− τ)wt (2)
Type θ2t is the type who is indifferent between becoming an employee or an employer and is
implicitly defined by
F (L(wt, θ
2
t ), θ
2
t )− wtL(wt, θ2t ) = wtθ2t (3)
From Definition 1, then, the wage rate wt satisfies∫ θ¯
θ2t
L(wt, θ)[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ =
∫ θ2t
θ1t
θ[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ (4)
Define
X(τ, wt, Qt) =
∫ θ2t
θ1t
θh(θ)dθ −
∫ θ¯
θ2t
L(wt, θ)h(θ)dθ
Assumption 1. The distribution of immigrant types h(θ) is such that X(τ, w˜, 1) ≥ 0, where
w˜ = w(τ, 1).
Since X(τ, wt, Qt) represents the net supply for labour by immigrants, Assumption 1 means
that immigrants always contribute more to the supply side of the labour market.
In each period, each country can decide to stop the inflow of migrants. We will sometimes refer
to this decision as building a wall against immigration. We assume that if in period t the option of
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 building the wall can win the majority in parliament, a party that supports it will propose a wall
bill. With this assumption the analysis simply needs to focus on the time when the possibility of
building a wall becomes a winning option.
In one of the two countries, the composition of parliament is determined by a winner take all
system. We assume that the majority of parliament members has preferences over immigration
that are identical to those of the median voter in the population (in the next section, we show
that the median voter is well defined in this framework). In this country, the wall will be build at
a given time t if and only if the median type θmt is in favour of it.
The other country uses a proportional representation system. We assume that there exist three
parties, each representing a different occupation. We denote by E the party of employers, by L the
party of employees and by D the one of unemployed. Each party wants to maximise the average
utility of the native individuals in the occupation it represents. That is,
uE(τ,Qt) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α) + (1− τ)yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− c
uL(τ,Qt) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α) + (1− τ)θˆl(τ,Qt)wt − c
uD(τ,Qt) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α)
where
θˆl(τ,Qt) =
∫ θ2t
θ1t
θg(θ)dθ∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
and
yˆe(L,wt, Qt) =
∫ θ¯
θ2t
ye(L,wt, θ)g(θ)dθ∫ θ¯
θ2t
g(θ)dθ
Each party’s share of parliament seats corresponds to the share of native individuals in the occupa-
tion it represents. When a party has the majority of parliament seats, it unilaterally decides about
the construction of the wall. If no party has the majority in parliament, coalition governments
will be formed and the wall will be built when at least two parties agree about it.
In what follows, we will refer to the country using the winner take all system as country W
and to the one using PR as country P .
3 Results for a fixed tax rate
We begin by assuming that the tax rate τ does not differ across the two countries. Our first goal
is to establish the effect of immigration on wages and occupational choices. Under Assumption 1,
immigrants contribute more to the supply side of the labour market. Then,
Lemma 1. The equilibrium wage rate wt is differentiable, strictly decreasing and nonlinear in Q.
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 For any level of immigration Qt, then, wt < wt+1. When wages decrease, being an employee
becomes less attractive. Indeed, employees’ gross income is strictly increasing in w, while the
envelope theorem implies
∂ye(L,w, θ)
∂w
= −L(w, θ) < 0.
For both occupations, the magnitude of the effect increases with θ. Since benefits are equally
distributed across the population, then, the entrance of migrants modifies optimal labour decisions.
More formally, from (2) and (3), one gets ∂θ1t /∂w < 0 and ∂θ
2
t /∂w > 0
2. Then, θ1t < θ
1
t+1 < θ
2
t+1 <
θ2t .
In order to avoid trivial cases, in what follows we will maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 2. θ2(τ, w˜, 1) > 1/2, where w˜ = w(τ, 1).
In words, we simply assume that even in the extreme situation of full openness, where all
potential migrants enter, the set of endogenous employers can never be an absolute majority of
the population. Given that θ2(τ, w,Qt) decreases as migrants keep entering, this assumption is a
sufficient condition to guarantee that the set of employers is never an absolute majority throughout
the whole entry process.
3.1 Immigration under winner take all
Immigration affects the native population through the wage rate and through benefits. Since the
negative effect on employees’ wage rate is increasing in type, whenever an employee is in favour
of building the wall, all employees with higher type will be in favour too. On the contrary, if
an employee prefers to accept more migrants, all lower-type employees will agree. Furthermore,
employees can be in favour of accepting more migrants only if these have a strong positive effect on
benefits. Given that unemployed individuals are not affected by a change in wages and employers
strictly benefit from it, these types must also be in favour of more migration. Thus, if employees
constitute a large share of the population, the median must be a relatively low type of employee.
If employees are not the majority in the population, instead, the median type in the distribution
of preferences on migration will be an unemployed individual. The intuition is similar to the one
just described. An unemployed individual prefers to build a wall if and only if the entrance of
new migrants reduces the benefits she receives. This immediately implies that employees will be
in favour of the construction of the wall too. If instead benefits increase with the entrance of new
migrants, then unemployed individuals and employers will both support open borders.
This intuition is formalised in Lemma 2. Let θd denote a type θ ∈ (0, θ1t ); denote by θlt = θl(Qt)
the type θ such that ∫ θ2t+1
θ
g(θ)dθ =
1
2
(5)
2The first result immediately follows by differentiating (2) with respect to w. For the second, we refer to equation
(A5) in the proof of Proposition 1 in AS (p. 1258).
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 if such a type is greater than θ1t+1 (otherwise θ
l
t does not exist). In words, type θ
l
t is such that the
mass of types θ ∈ [θlt, θ2t+1] that are employees at time t and would remain employees at time t+ 1
is exactly one half of the population. Then,
Lemma 2. The median type in the distribution of preferences on immigration θmt = θ
m(Qt) is
defined by
θmt =
θlt if
∫ θ2t+1
θ1t+1
g(θ)dθ ≥ 1
2
θd otherwise
The main implication of Lemma 2 is that, whenever (5) is well defined, the median type in the
distribution of preferences over immigration is decreasing in Q. Since θ2t+1 < θ
2
t for all t, the lower
bound in (5) must move to the left to guarantee that the equality is satisfied. Then, as long as at
any given time t
∫ θ2t+1
θ1t+1
g(θ)dθ ≥ 1
2
(6)
and xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ
l
t) ≥ xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θlt), more migrants will enter the country. As the entry
process continues, θlt − θ1t decreases in t. Denote by t′ the first time in which θ1t > θlt, i.e., the
first time in which the median voter becomes an unemployed. If the entry process has reached
this stage, without a wall proposal by any previous median voter, then from t′ on, more migrants
will be admitted until, at some period t
′′
, b(τ, wt′′ , Qt′′ , α) > b(τ, wt′′+1, Qt′′+1, α) or Qt′′ = 1. A
sufficient condition for the wall to be built before all the immigrants enter the country is
b(τ, w˜δ, 1− δ, α) > b(τ, w˜, 1, α) (7)
where w˜δ = w(τ, 1− δ).
Proposition 1. Assume (7) is satisfied. If t is such that (6) holds, country W will build the wall
if and only if
xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ
l
t) ≤ xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θlt) (8)
When (6) does not hold, the wall will be built if and only if
xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ
d) ≤ xd(τ, wt, Qt, α, θd) (9)
3.2 Immigration under PR
Suppose that, at a given time t, employees constitute the majority in the population, i.e.∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ ≥ 1
2
(10)
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 Then, party L must have the majority of seats in parliament and the wall will be built if and only
if uL(τ,Qt) ≥ uL(τ,Qt+1), or equivalently if and only if
xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θˆl(τ,Qt)) ≥ xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θˆl(τ,Qt+1))
By the same reasoning used for winner take all systems, if borders are kept open for sufficiently
long, a time t′ can be reached when ∫ θ2
t′
θ1
t′
g(θ)dθ <
1
2
Our next lemma focuses on the construction of the wall in this scenario. Suppose that party D
prefers to build the wall, since
b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) ≥ 0
If employees’ average net income is decreasing in immigration, party L will support the construction
of the wall too. Given the negative effect on benefits, a sufficient condition for this to hold is
that employees’ average gross income θˆl(τ,Qt)wt decreases with Q. By reducing the wage rate,
immigration affects employees’ average gross income both directly and indirectly. The direct effect
is a decrease in aggregate employees’ income, which clearly has a negative impact on the average.
The indirect effect arises because immigration shrinks the set of types choosing occupation l: high-
type employees will become employers, while lower-type employees will switch to unemployment.
The first component has a negative effect on the average, the second one affects it positively. If the
distribution g(θ) is uniform, the direct effect on aggregate income always dominates the positive
indirect effect, so that employees’ average gross income is always decreasing in Q. For other types
of distribution, a sufficient condition is∫ θ2t
θ1t
θg(θ)dθ >
∂θ1t
∂w
g(θ1t )[θ
1
twt − θˆl(τ,Qt)wt] (11)
The left-hand-side of (11) measures the decrease in aggregate income due to a decrease in wages.
The right-hand-side measures the positive effect on the average arising from a switch in occupa-
tion by the types around θ1t . When (11) holds, employees’ average net income is decreasing in
immigration. Notice that this is a restrictive condition, as it completely disregards the behavior
of types around θ2t .
Lemma 3. Consider a country whose parliament is elected with proportional representation. If,
at some period t, (10) is not satisfied and (11) holds,
uD(τ,Qt) ≥ uD(τ,Qt+1)⇒ uL(τ,Qt) ≥ uL(τ,Qt+1)
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 Lemma 3 and the discussion above directly imply the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume (7) and (11) hold. If t satisfies (10), country P will build the wall if and
only if
xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θˆl(τ,Qt+1)) < xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θˆl(τ,Qt)) (12)
When (10) is not satisfied, (9) is a sufficient condition for the wall to be built.
3.3 Comparison between the two systems
In this section, we combine Propositions 1 and 2 to compare the degree of openness of the two
countries. Suppose that condition (6) holds at some time t. Then, (10) must hold too. By
Proposition 1, country W will build the wall if and only if θlt is in favour of it, i.e. if (8) holds. By
Proposition 2, country P will close its borders if and only if (12) holds. Whenever
θˆl(τ,Qt+1)wt+1 − θˆl(τ,Qt)wt ≤ θlt(wt+1 − wt) (13)
(12) is implied by (8). Then, if a wall bill is passed in country W , the same bill will be passed
in country P too. Since the opposite implication is not true, there can be levels of immigration
at which country P wants to build the wall, while country W prefers to admit immigrants for at
least another period.
Now suppose that (6) does not hold at some time t, so that country W will pass a wall bill
if and only if (9) holds. Again, country P will want to build the wall any time country W does.
When (10) holds, (12) is implied by (9). When (10) does not hold, the result directly follows from
Proposition 2. Let tW denote the smallest t at which country W decides to build the wall and
denote by tP the equivalent date country P . Then
Proposition 3. Assume (7) and (11) are satisfied. Then, if (13) holds, tW ≥ tP .
4 Results with different endogenous tax levels
Let us now fix the level of immigration Qt and examine the optimal choice of tax τ under the
two electoral systems.3 For winner take all, we assume that the implemented tax level is the one
preferred by the majority of the population of natives. For PR, we consider a legislative bargaining
process a` la Baron and Diermeier (cite). Denote by τ0 the given status quo level of taxation. After
3The conclusions in this section are practically identical to those discussed by AS. The results in AS rely on
single-peakedness of individuals’ preferences over taxation. However, as noted by Morelli and Negri (2017), the
argument proving single-peakedness contains a mistake and the property cannot be established. Morelli and Negri
(2017) provide an alternative proof of the results, based on the property of single-crossing preferences (Gans and
Smart (1996)). This section complements the results in AS and Morelli and Negri (2017) with additional results
for PR.
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 elections, if a party P ∈ {E ,L,D} obtains the majority of the votes, it will implement the tax
level maximizing uP(τ,Qt). If no party obtains the majority, one party will be selected randomly
to propose a tax rate. We assume each party is selected as a proposer with a probability equal to
the share of native individuals in the occupation it represents. The proposed tax rate is then put
to a vote against the status quo τ0. If at least another party agrees with the proposal, the new tax
rate is implemented. The tax rate remains τ0 otherwise. Denote by p(τ |τ0) the probability that
tax rate τ is chosen by the legislative bargaining process when τ0 is the status quo. Our focus is
on stable tax rates.4
Definition 2. A tax rate τ is stable if p(τ |τ) = 1.
A stable tax rate is a status quo tax rate that is never changed by the legislative bargaining
process and could be interpreted as a long-run tax rate. Focusing on stable tax rates allows to not
make the comparison between winner take all and PR dependent on the status quo tax rate.
Before introducing the results for the two systems, notice that
Lemma 4 (Lemma 1 in AS). For a fixed level of immigration Qt, the equilibrium wage rate wt is
differentiable, strictly increasing and nonlinear in τ .
We refer to AS for the proof of the lemma and simply note that
∂wt
∂τ
=
wt(θ
1
t )
2[g(θ1t ) +Qth(θ
1
t )]
(1− τ)A(τ, wt, Qt)
with A(τ, wt, Qt) as defined in (21). Let (τ) and ˜(τ) denote the tax elasticity of the equilibrium
wage rate and the tax elasticity of the marginal equilibrium wage rate,
(τ) =
∂wt
∂τ
τ
wt
˜(τ) =
∂2wt
∂τ 2
τ
∂wt
∂τ
In what follows, we assume
Assumption 3.
(1− τ)˜(τ) ≤ (1− τ)(τ) + τ
Assumption 3 is identical to condition (5) in AS5 and allows us to use some of the results
contained in the paper.
4Our definition of stable tax rate is a simplified version of the PRPE-stable equilibrium in AS (p.1251).
5Condition (5) in AS also includes a lower bound for (1 − τ)˜(τ). As shown in Morelli and Negri (2017), this
lower bound is not necessary.
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 4.1 Taxation under winner take all
For any given immigration level Qt, let ξ(τ,Qt, θ) denote a type θ’s maximum consumption level
at a given tax rate τ and sorting equilibrium wt = w(τ,Qt). That is
ξ(τ,Qt, θ) = max
j∈{e,l,d}
xj(·, θ)
Suppose the median type in the distribution g(θ), θ˜, is an employee, i.e. θ1t < θ˜ < θ
2
t .
Lemma 5. For any two tax levels τ, τ ′ such that τ < τ ′,
1. ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜) ≥ ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ˜)⇒ ξ(τ,Qt, θ) ≥ ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ) for all θ > θ˜
2. ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ˜) ≥ ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜)⇒ ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ) ≥ ξ(τ,Qt, θ) for all θ < θ˜
Lemma 5 proves that individuals’ preferences over taxation satisfy a weak version of the single-
crossing condition (Gans Smart (1996)). The result was proven by Morelli and Negri (2017) and
the proof we provide in the appendix is just an adaptation of the proof to our framework. A
direct implication of the lemma is that θ˜ is the median type in the distribution of preferences over
taxation. Let τW be the tax level implemented by country W . Then
τW = arg max
τ
(1− τ)θ˜wt + b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− c
4.2 Taxation under PR
In order to identify the stable tax rate, we first need to understand parties’ behavior in the
legislative bargaining process. In the following lemma, we show that parties’ preferences over
taxation also satisfy a weak version of the single-crossing condition. More precisely, the lemma
shows that party L is the median party. The first part of the lemma is a direct consequence of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 5 in AS. Lemma 2 states that, under Assumption 3, benefits (and therefore
uD(τ,Qt)) are strictly concave in τ , with interior arg max. Define
V (τ) ≡ 1− (1− τ)
wt
∂wt
∂τ
(14)
AS shows that V (τ) > 0.6 Lemma 5 in AS states that, when
∂θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂τ
≥ ∂
2θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂τ 2
[
1− τ
1 + V (τ)
]
(15)
6This is shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in AS. Using the formula for ∂wt/∂τ , one gets
V (τ) = 1− (θ
1
t )
2[g(θ1t ) +Qth(θ
1
t )]
A(τ, wt, Qt)
and since A(τ, wt, Qt) > (θ
1
t )
2[g(θ1t ) +Qth(θ
1
t )], V (τ) > 0.
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 party L’s utility is strictly quasiconcave in τ . Furthermore, denoting by τP the maximizer of
uP(τ,Qt), the lemma proves that τL < τD. This immediately implies that for all τ ′ > τ , if party
L prefers τ ′ to τ , then party D also prefers τ ′, which is the first statement in our Lemma 6. The
second statement in our lemma states that, when party L prefers a lower tax rate, party E must
prefer lower taxes too. A sufficient condition for this to hold is that average employers’ income
is decreasing in τ . Higher tax rates imply higher wages. On the one hand, this decreases the
income of every employer, therefore decreasing the average. On the other hand, it induces low-
type employers to become employees, therefore increasing the average. The net effect is negative
when ∫ θ¯
θ2t
L(wt, θ)g(θ)dθ >
∂θ2t
∂w
g(θ2t )[yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− ye(L,wt, θ2t )] (16)
The left-hand-side of (16) measures the total increase in the cost of labor due to an increase in
wages. The right-hand-side corresponds to the increase in the average employers’ income due to
the endogenous occupational decisions.
Lemma 6. If (15) and (16) hold,
1. uL(τ,Qt) ≤ uL(τ ′, Qt)⇒ uD(τ,Qt) ≤ uD(τ ′, Qt)
2. uL(τ,Qt) ≥ uL(τ ′, Qt)⇒ uE(τ,Qt) ≥ uE(τ ′, Qt)
for all τ < τ ′.
Lemma 6 directly implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If no party has the absolute majority of seats in parliament and (15) and (16)
hold, the unique stable tax rate is
τL = arg max
τ
uP(τ,Qt)
Let τP be the tax rate in country P . Then, τP = τL.
4.3 Immigration decisions under different endogenous tax rates
From now on, we assume that conditions (15) and (16) in Proposition 4 are satisfied. One of the
most important results in AS, which holds in our model too, is the following conclusion about the
tax rates in the two countries:
Proposition 5 (Proposition 6 in AS). There exists a cost of working c¯ such that, for all c ≤ c¯,
τP > τW .
We refer to AS for the proof.
Proposition 5 becomes very important for our purposes when combined with the following
lemma
13
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 Lemma 7. The share of employees in the native population is decreasing in τ ,
∂
∂τ
[∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
]
< 0
Assume by contradiction that the share of employees in the native population was increasing
in τ . Then the labor supply would increase with τ too. Since ∂w/∂τ > 0, the increase in labor
supply must be associated with an even larger increase in labor demand. However, ∂θ2t /∂w > 0
implies that labor demand must decrease. Then, the share of employees in the population must
be decreasing in τ .
Consider time t = 0 before the inflow of migrants begins and let τW0 and τ
P
0 denote the tax
levels implemented by the two countries at this date. By Proposition 5 and Lemma 7, the share
of natives choosing occupation l in country P is strictly lower than the one in country W . In
particular, it is possible to have∫ θ20(τP0 )
θ10(τ
P
0 )
g(θ)dθ <
1
2
≤
∫ θ20(τW0 )
θ10(τ
W
0 )
g(θ)dθ (17)
where θ10(τ) ≡ θ1(τ, w0, 0) and θ20(τ) ≡ θ2(τ, w0, 0). When (17) holds, Propositions 1 and 2 (under
(7) and (11)) imply that country W and country P will close their borders when (8) and (9) hold,
respectively. For a given tax level τ and level of immigration Qt, define the maximum share of
resources α that types θlt and θ
d are willing to transfer to immigrants to keep the borders open as
αWl (τ,Qt) ≡
τ [Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)− Y (τ, wt, Qt)]− (1− τ)θlt(wt − wt+1)
τ [Qt+1Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)−QtY (τ, wt, Qt)] (18)
and
αd(τ,Qt) ≡ Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)− Y (τ, wt, Qt)
Qt+1Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)−QtY (τ, wt, Qt) (19)
Notice that, since wage is decreasing in Q, αWl (τ,Qt) < αd(τ, 0) for all τ . These definitions imply
that
xl(τ
W , w1, δ, α, θ
l
0) ≥ xl(τW , w0, 0, α, θl0)
for all α ≤ αWl (τW , 0) and
xd(τ
P , w1, δ, α, θ
d) ≥ xd(τP , w0, 0, α, θd)
for all α ≤ αd(τP , 0). Let
η(τ,Qt) ≡ dY (τ, wt, Qt)
dτ
τ
Y (τ, wt, Qt)
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 η˜(τ,Qt) ≡ d
2Y (τ, wt, Qt)
dQtdτ
τ
dY (τ,wt,Qt)
dQ
be the tax elasticity of aggregate income and the tax elasticity of the marginal effect of immigration
on aggregate income, respectively. Then,
Lemma 8. If
η˜(τ,Qt) > η(τ,Qt) (20)
then
∂αd(τ,Qt)
∂τ
> 0
Given that η(τ,Qt) < 0, condition (20) is equivalent to requiring that higher taxes do not
reduce too much the positive effect that immigration has on aggregate income. Lemma 8 implies
that, at time t = 0, αd(τ
W
0 , 0) < αd(τ
P
0 , 0). Then,
Proposition 6. Assume (7), (11) and (17). Then, η˜(τW0 , 0) > η(τ
W
0 , 0) is a sufficient condition
to have
xd(τ
P
0 , w1, δ, α, θ
d) ≤ xd(τP0 , w0, 0, α, θd)⇒ xl(τW0 , w1, δ, α, θl0) ≤ xl(τW0 , w0, 0, α, θl0)
for all α ≤ α¯(τP0 , 0).
In words, Proposition 6 states that, at the beginning of the immigration process, country
P can be relatively more open than country W . Country P will keep its borders open for all
α ≤ αd(τP0 , 0). When α ≤ αd(τW0 , 0), country W might or might not build the wall, depending on
how strongly immigration affects wages. When αd(τ
W
0 , 0) < α ≤ αd(τP0 , 0), the country will for
sure close its borders.
Clearly, Proposition 6 does not imply that countries using a PR system are always more open
than those using winner take all. However, it has an important implication on the analysis of
migration policies. The main conclusion of Section 3 (Proposition 3) was that, ceteris paribus,
winner take all systems are relatively more open than PR. The results in this section show that
the ceteris paribus assumption is not innocuous. When the tax levels are determined endogenously,
countries using PR systems can be strictly more open to immigration than countries using winner
take all systems. In the next section, we simulate the model and provide a graphical representation
of how different redistribution levels affect the openness level of the two countries.
5 Simulations
The best way to graphically compare the results in Sections 3 and 4 is to focus on the maximum
share of resources α that a country is willing to transfer to immigrants to be willing to keep its
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 borders open. For any tax level τ and immigration level Qt, let such values be denoted by α
W (τ,Qt)
and αP (τ,Qt), for country W and country P , respectively. The values of α
W (τ,Qt) and α
P (τ,Qt)
depend on the share of employees in the country. By Proposition 1,
αW (τ,Qt) =
αWl (τ,Qt) if (6) holdsαd(τ,Qt) otherwise
where αWl (τ,Qt) and αd(τ,Qt) are as defined in (18) and (19), respectively. By Proposition 2,
αP (τ,Qt) =
αPl (τ,Qt, ) if (10) holdsαd(τ,Qt) otherwise
with
αPl (τ,Qt) ≡
τ [Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)− Y (τ, wt, Qt)]− (1− τ)
[
θˆl(τ,Qt)wt − θˆl(τ,Qt+1)wt+1
]
τ [Qt+1Y (τ, wt+1, Qt+1)−QtY (τ, wt, Qt)]
Our analysis in Section 3 predicts that, when the tax level is the same in the two countries,
country W will never build the wall before country P . An equivalent way to phrase Proposition 3
is
αW (τ,Qt) ≥ αP (τ,Qt)
for all Qt. If the actual value of α is greater than α
W (τ,Qt), both countries will build the wall;
if it is smaller than αP (τ,Qt), they will both keep their borders open; Whenever α
W (τ,Qt) >
α > αP (τ,Qt), country P will build the wall, while country W will let immigrants enter for at
least another period. In Proposition 6, we showed that this conclusion might not hold when the
difference in redistribution levels in the two countries is taken into account. That is,
αW (τW , Qt) ≤ αP (τP , Qt)
when Qt is low enough. In this section, we simulate the values of α
W (τW0 , Qt), α
P (τW0 , Qt) and
αP (τP0 , Qt) as a function of Qt. To perform the simulations, we make the following assumptions
on the primitives of the model. We set
F (L, θ) = L1/2θ2
and assume natives’ and immigrants’ types to be uniformly distributed on (0, 1) and (0, 0.9),
respectively. Finally, we set c = 0.05. Given the assumptions on the production function,
L(wt, θ) =
θ4
4w2t
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 Substituting for L(wt, θ) in the profit function and using (3), we find
θ2t = (2wt)
2/3
The equilibrium wage can then be explicitly derived from (4). The optimal tax levels τW0 and τ
P
0
are found by maximizing xl(τ, w0, 0, α, θ
l
0) and uL(τ, 0) with respect to τ . They are τ
W
0 ≈ 0.5 and
τP0 ≈ 0.6.7 Given the tax levels and the other parameters of the model, one can check that
X(τW0 , w(τ
W
0 , 1), 1) ≈ 0.098 X(τP0 , w(τP0 , 1), 1) ≈ 0.095
so that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Figure 1 shows the results of the simulations. The discontinuities
in the graphs of αW (τW0 , Qt) and α
P (τW0 , Qt) happen at the values of Q such that (6) and (10) hold
with the equal sign. These are the values of Q such that the median type switches from θlt to θd
in country W and the median party changes from L to D in country P . The graph of αP (τW0 , Qt)
is continuous in Q because the initial share of employees in country P at tax level τP0 is already
lower than one-half (0.45).
As predicted by the theory, when the tax level is fixed at τW0 in both countries, country W is
always weakly more open than country P , i.e. αW (τW0 , Qt) ≥ αP (τW0 , Qt) for all Qt. When the tax
level in country P is also determined endogenously, the opposite conclusion holds when the number
of migrants entering the country is small enough. More precisely, αW (τW0 , Qt) ≤ αP (τP0 , Qt), for
all Q < 1.06. It is interesting to notice that, given our assumptions on the primitives of the model,
η˜(τW0 , Qt) < η(τ
W
0 , Qt)
for all Qt, proving that the condition stated in Proposition 6 is indeed only sufficient.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
We have shown that different electoral systems may induce countries to choose different immigra-
tion policies, and that the predictions depend crucially on the implications that electoral systems
have also for the determination of redistribution policies. We have conducted the analysis keeping
constant and equal the supply of migrants across countries, because our focus was exclusively on
the demand side.
In future research we plan to complemment these results with a supply or selection analysis,
and we plan to answer a number of important questions:
- first, it can be shown that borders remaining open is the more politically feasible the more
selection is possible in terms of enfranchisement, i.e., giving the right to vote to agents with θ
7Even though Assumption 3 is not satisfied, both xl(τ, w0, 0, α, θ
l
0) and uL(τ, 0) can be shown to be strictly
concave in τ .
17
                            18 / 27
 Figure 1: 1 = αW (τW0 , Qt), 2 = α
P (τW0 , Qt), 3 = α
P (τP0 , Qt).
above a certain threshold actually helps the possibility of endogenous open borders, especially in
WTA systems.8
- Second, an interesting question could be the attractiveness of different immigration policies
across systems, in the sense that one system could favor changes in welfare extensions or enfran-
chisement rules whereas the other could be more likely to build the wall or choose selection policies
at the entry point.
- Third, we plan to address endogenous selection of types on the supply side: for similar
economic structure and perspectives in two countries, migrants would prefer one to the other
if the conditions on institutional insurance or expectations of integration (or even voting) differ
substantially. PR, having higher wages and taxes, could induce negative selection, in the sense that
the most talented individuals could prefer to supply themselves to WTA countries. The conjecture
is that such selection effects may make it comparatively more likely that borders would be closed
first in PR systems.
Can a destination ranking be sustainable and under what conditions? In a world of equal
growth rate across destination countries, it seems likely that the expected payoffs of migrants
should equalize across destinations, and hence there should be a frontier of immigration policies.
For example two countries offer the same expected utility to migrants of a given type if either all
variables are the same or one has higher α but the other has more generous enfranchisement.
Answering all these questions will further increase the heuristic power of the model we have
chosen to propose for the study of immigration policies, which is an increasingly important topic
8The comparison in terms of enfranchisement between the two systems can be done in terms of the θ above
which the majority of parliamentarians is in favor of having them vote.
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 in political economy.
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 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. By Proposition 1 in AS, w(τ,Qt) is unique and implicitly defined by (4). Dif-
ferentiating the condition with respect to Q, we get
∂wt
∂Q
= −wtX(τ, wt, Qt)
A(τ, wt, Qt)
< 0.
with
A(τ, wt, Qt) = F (L(wt, θ
2
t ), θ
2
t )[g(θ
2
t ) +Qth(θ
2
t )]
∂θ2t
∂w
+ (θ1t )
2[g(θ1) +Qth(θ1)]
− wt
∫ θ¯
θ2t
Lw(wt, θ)[g(θ) +Qth(θ)]dθ (21)
where we used (3) to obtain the first term in A(τ, wt, Qt) and we subsituted for ∂θ
1
t /∂w using (2)
in the second term. Using (3), we get ∂θ2t /∂w > 0 (see Footnote 3) and since labour demand is
decreasing in w, we get A(τ, wt, Qt) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ∫ θ2t+1
θ1t+1
g(θ)dθ ≥ 1
2
and let θlt satisfy (5). Since wt > wt+1, the function
xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)−xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) = (1− τ)θ(wt−wt+1) + b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α)
(22)
must be increasing in θ. Then, xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ
l
t)xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ
l
t) ≥ 0, implies xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)−
xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θlt, θ2t+1]. By the definition of θlt, these voters constitute the
majority in the native population.
Now let xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ
l
t)−xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θlt) ≤ 0. By the same reasoning, xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)−
xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1t+1, θlt]. Furthermore, since the first term in (22) is positive,
it must be that b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) > b(τ, wt, Qt, α). This immediately implies xd(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ) −
xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (0, θ1t ]. Since
∂ye(L,w, θ)
∂w
= −L(w, θ) < 0
for all w, we have that
xe(L, τ, wt, Qt, α, θ
l
t)− xe(L, τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θlt)
= (1− τ)[ye(L,wt, θ)− ye(L,wt+1, θ′)] + b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) < 0 (23)
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 for all θ ∈ (θ2t , θ¯). Now consider all θ ∈ (θ1t , θ1t+1). For all these types
(1− τ)θwt − c < (1− τ)θ(wt − wt+1) ≤ b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α)− b(τ, wt, Qt, α)
which directly implies xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ) − xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) < 0. Finally, consider any θ ∈
(θ2t+1, θ
2
t ]. For these types
(1− τ)[wtθ − ye(L,wt+1, θ)] < (1− τ)θ(wt − wt+1) ≤ b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α)− b(τ, wt, Qt, α) (24)
so that xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)− xe(L, τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) < 0. Combining everything, we have that if θlt
prefers Qt+1 to Qt, then all θ /∈ (θlt, θ2t+1) also prefer Qt+1 to Qt. As before, by the way θlt was
defined, these people constitute the majority in the population of natives.
Now suppose ∫ θ2t+1
θ1t+1
g(θ)dθ <
1
2
∫ θ¯
θ2t+1
g(θ)dθ <
1
2
(25)
Whenever xd(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)− xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) > 0, then
xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ)− xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) = (1− τ)θwt− c+ b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) > 0
for all θ ∈ (θ1t , θ1t+1). Furthermore, by (22), xl(τ, wt, Qt, α, θlt) − xl(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θlt) > 0 for all
θ ∈ [θ1t+1, θ2t+1). Thus, if an unemployed individual prefers Qt to Qt+1, all types θ /∈ [θ2t+1, θ¯)
also prefer Qt. By the second inequality in (25), these types constitute the majority. Whenever
xd(τ, wt, Qt, α, θ) − xd(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α, θ) ≤ 0, so that unemployed individuals prefer Qt+1 to Qt,
then by (23) and (24) all types θ ∈ [θ2t+1, θ¯) also prefer Qt+1. By the first inequality in (25), Qt+1
will have the support of the majority of the native population.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose uD(Qt)− uD(Qt+1) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) ≥ 0, so that
party D is in favour of building the wall. The party will be able to form a coalition with party L
if and only if
uL(Qt)− uL(Qt+1) = b(τ, wt, Qt, α)− b(τ, wt+1, Qt+1, α) + (1− τ)[θˆl(τ,Qt)wt − θˆl(Qt+1)wt+1] ≥ 0
A sufficient condition for this to hold is
dθˆl(τ,Qt)wt
dQ
= wt
dθˆl(τ,Qt)
dQ
+ θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂wt
∂Q
< 0 (26)
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 Using the definition of θˆl(τ,Qt), we get
dθˆl(τ,Qt)
dQ
=
(∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
)−2
∂wt
∂Q
[
∂θ2t
∂w
g(θ2t )
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ2t − θ)g(θ)dθ −
∂θ1t
∂w
g(θ1t )
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ1t − θ)g(θ)dθ
]
Then,
dθˆl(τ,Qt)wt
dQ
=
∂wt
∂Q
(∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
)−1(
∂θ2t
∂w
g(θ2t )wt
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ2t − θ)g(θ)dθ −
∂θ1t
∂w
g(θ1t )wt
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ1t − θ)g(θ)dθ
)
+
∫ θ2t
θ1t
θg(θ)dθ
](∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
)−1
When (11) holds,
∫ θ2t
θ1t
θg(θ)dθ >
(∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
)−1(
∂θ1t
∂w
g(θ1t )wt
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ1t − θ)g(θ)dθ
)
and dθˆl(τ,Qt)wt/dQ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5 (from [14]). Let θ > θ˜ first. A sufficient condition for 1. to hold is
ξ(τ,Qt, θ)− ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ) ≥ ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜)− ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ˜)
for all τ < τ ′. Rearranging terms, we get
ξ(τ,Qt, θ)− ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜) ≥ ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ)− ξ(τ ′, Qt, θ˜)
Thus, 1. holds if the function ∆ξ(τ) ≡ ξ(τ,Qt, θ)−ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜) is decreasing in τ . By assumption, the
median type is an employee, so that ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜) = xl(τ, w,Qt, α, θ˜). For all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ2t ), ξ(τ,Qt, θ) =
xl(τ, w,Qt, α, θ). Then, ∆ξ(τ) = (1 − τ)(θ − θ˜)wt. Deriving it with respect to τ and rearranging
terms, we get
d∆ξ(τ)
dτ
= −(θ − θ˜)wtV (τ)
where V (τ) > 0 is as defined in (14). For all θ ∈ [θ2t , θ¯), ξ(τ,Qt, θ) = xe(L, τ, w,Qt, α, θ). Then,
∆ξ(τ) = (1− τ)[ye(L,wt, θ)− wtθ˜] and
d∆ξ(τ)
dτ
= −[ye(L,wt, θ)− wtθ˜] + (1− τ)
[
∂ye(L,wt, θ)
∂τ
− θ˜ ∂wt
∂τ
]
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 By the envelope theorem,
∂ye(L,wt, θ)
∂τ
= −L(wt, θ)∂wt
∂τ
Then,
d∆ξ(τ)
dτ
= −[ye(L,wt, θ)− wtθ˜]− (1− τ)
[
L(wt, θ) + θ˜
] ∂wt
∂τ
< 0
as gross income is increasing in θ and wage is increasing in τ .
By a similar reasoning, a sufficient condition for 2. to hold is d∆ξ(τ)/dτ > 0, whenever θ < θ˜.
For all θ ∈ [θ1t , θ˜), ξ(τ,Qt, θ˜) = xl(τ, w,Qt, α, θ˜) and ∆ξ(τ) = (1 − τ)(θ − θ˜)wt. For all types
θ ∈ (0, θ1t ), ξ(τ, θ) = xd(τ, w,Qt, α, θ) and ∆ξ(τ) = −(1 − τ)θ˜wt + c. In both cases, V (τ) > 0
implies d∆ξ(τ)/dτ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6, point 1. Consider the first item in the statement of the lemma. A sufficient
condition for it to hold is that
uE(τ,Qt)− uE(τ ′, Qt) ≥ uL(τ,Qt)− uL(τ ′, Qt)
or, rearranging terms,
uE(τ,Qt)− uL(τ,Qt) ≥ uE(τ ′, Qt)− uL(τ ′, Qt). (27)
Substituting for uE(τ,Qt) and uL(τ,Qt), (27) becomes
(1− τ)[yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− θˆl(τ,Qt)wt] ≥ (1− τ ′)[yˆe(L,w′t, Qt)− θˆl(τ ′, Qt)w′t]
where w′t ≡ w(τ ′, Qt). Define the function ∆(τ) ≡ (1− τ)[yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− θˆl(τ,Qt)wt]. Then
∂∆(τ)
∂τ
= −[yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− θˆl(τ,Qt)wt] + (1− τ)
[
∂yˆe(L,wt, Qt)
∂τ
− ∂θˆl(τ,Qt)wt
∂τ
]
The first term in ∂∆(τ)/∂τ is always negative since
yˆe(L,wt, Qt) > ye(L,wt, θ
2
t ) = θ
2
twt > θˆl(τ,Qt)wt
Furthermore,
∂yˆe(L,wt, Qt)
∂τ
= −
(∫ θ¯
θ2t
g(θ)dθ
)−1
∂w
∂τ
{∫ θ¯
θ2t
L(wt, θ)g(θ)dθ − ∂θ
2
t
∂w
g(θ2t )[yˆe(L,wt, Qt)− ye(L,wt, θ2t )]
}
< 0
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 when (16) holds. Finally,
∂θˆl(τ,Qt)wt
∂τ
= wt
∂θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂τ
+ θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂wt
∂τ
> 0
since
∂θˆl(τ,Qt)
∂τ
=
(∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
)−1{
∂θ2t
∂w
∂w
∂τ
g(θ2t )
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ2t − θ)g(θ)dθ +
θ1t g(θ
1
t )
1− τ V (τ)
∫ θ2t
θ1t
(θ − θ1t )g(θ)dθ
}
> 0
with V (τ) as defined in (14). Combining everything, we get ∂∆(τ)/∂τ < 0, implying that (27)
holds.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose τL is the status quo tax rate. By Lemma 6, a coalition of two
parties always prefers τL to any other proposed tax rate τ : when τ < τL, the coalition includes
parties L and D; when τ > τL, it includes parties L and E . This proves that τL is stable.
Now consider any other status quo tax rate τ0 6= τL. With some positive probability
piL =
∫ θ2t
θ1t
g(θ)dθ
party L will be the proposer and will always be able to form a coalition to replace τ0 with τL.
Then, for any τ0 6= τL, p(τ0|τ0) < 1.
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